Abstract
Abstract We provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of law enforcement collective bargaining rights on violent incidents of misconduct. Our empirical strategy exploits a 2003 Florida Supreme Court decision (Williams) conferring collective bargaining rights on sheriffs’ deputies. Using a state administrative database of “moral character” violations over 1996–2015, we implement a difference-in-difference approach in which police departments (PDs; which were unaffected by Williams) serve as a control group for sheriffs’ offices (SOs). Our estimates imply that collective bargaining rights led to a substantial increase in violent incidents of misconduct among SOs relative to PDs. This result is robust to including only violent incidents involving officers hired before Williams, suggesting that it is due to a deterrence mechanism rather than compositional effects. In a separate event-study analysis, unionization is associated with higher levels of violent misconduct, and so appears to be a channel for the effect. (JEL K42, J50, J45).
Highlights
Police unions sometimes successfully resist the imposition of discipline on officers for misconduct. Huq and McAdams (2016), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) show that many law enforcement collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for officers that make it difficult for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the excessive use of force.1 These scholars express concern that such contractual provisions undermine the ability of management to deter misconduct and may promote its commission
We find that violent incidents rose substantially among the sheriffs’ offices (SOs) treated by Williams in the years after Williams
Using a comprehensive state administrative database of “moral character” violations reported by local agencies in Florida and an empirical strategy based on the Florida Supreme Court’s Williams decision of 2003, we show that the conferral of collective bargaining rights on officers at SOs led to an increase in violent incidents, relative to a control group of police departments (PDs) that were unaffected by Williams
Summary
Police unions sometimes successfully resist the imposition of discipline on officers for misconduct. Huq and McAdams (2016), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) show that many law enforcement collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for officers that make it difficult for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the excessive use of force. These scholars express concern that such contractual provisions undermine the ability of management to deter misconduct and may promote its commission. Huq and McAdams (2016), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) show that many law enforcement collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for officers that make it difficult for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the excessive use of force.. Police unions sometimes successfully resist the imposition of discipline on officers for misconduct. Huq and McAdams (2016), Keenan and Walker (2005), and Rushin (2017) show that many law enforcement collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) create procedural rights for officers that make it difficult for agencies to investigate and discipline misconduct, including the excessive use of force.1 These scholars express concern that such contractual provisions undermine the ability of management to deter misconduct and may promote its commission. The theory of efficiency wages holds that paying wages above the market-clearing equilibrium may improve productivity, which, in the context of police, could entail decreased misconduct. the impact of collective bargaining on law enforcement misconduct is an empirical question
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