Collateral relief and adequate alternative remedies in constitutional litigation in the Commonwealth Caribbean

Abstract

This article examines the proviso to the ‘alternative remedies’ provision/clause in Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions. It does so from two perspectives emerging from the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in this area. In the first, exemplified by Harrikissoon v Attorney General, the applicant brings a constitutional motion for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms in circumstances where he may have an alternative remedy at common law or under statute. In that decision, the Privy Council delineated the scope of this proviso under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, effectively importing an ‘alternative remedies’ clause from the use of the word ‘may’ in section 14(2) of the Constitution. This article examines, first, what Harrikissoon decided; second, whether its reasoning is acceptable given the wording of the section; and, third, the limitations accepted by subsequent decisions of the Privy Council. In the second perspective, the applicant makes a similar application for infringements of his fundamental rights or freedoms arising from or occurring during the course of proceedings already begun. The locus classicus is the decision of Chokolingo v Attorney General and forms part of the wider concern of the courts to prevent its processes being abused where the applicant makes a collateral constitutional challenge rather than pursuing an ordinary appeal. This article also aims to examine the decisions that pre‐dated Chokolingo in order to understand its jurisprudential underpinnings; to explore that decision to determine what the Privy Council in Chokolingo decided; to consider the similarities and differences between the reasoning therein and that of the Privy Council in Harrikissoon; and to consider the extent to which the principle enunciated in Chokolingo has been extended or limited in subsequent decisions of the Privy Council.