Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy by John L. Campbell, and: The Demise of Nuclear Energy? Lessons for Democratic Control of Technology by Joseph G. Morone, Edward J. Woodhouse

Abstract

346 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE studies supply most of the critics’ data, too. Fradkin simply ignores the possibility that government acted in good faith, that honest people were persuaded by the weight of evidence that fallout had not, in fact, caused injury. Admittedly, the past record cautions against too san­ guine a view of official motives. Given disputes still troubling the scientific community, however, such a possibility is not farfetched, much though other factors may affect the picture. Fallout remains well worth reading as investigative reporting, if not full-fledged history. Overall, I found the book reasonably accurate, especially if one keeps in mind its central focus on trial proceedings. Most of the question marks I sprinkled in the margins dealt with specific points of fact or interpretation, not the central thesis. On this count, I think Fradkin makes the crucial case for AEG dissembling. The serious loss of trust in government so widely noted in recent years owes more than a little to the AEG and its handling of public concerns about the dangers of nuclear weapons testing. Whether or not AEG actions injured people more directly is something else. Although Fradkin largely takes it for granted, on this issue the jury is still out. Barton C. Hacker Dr. Hacker teaches occasional courses in the history of technology ancl military history at Oregon State University while completing his book. Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission mid Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947— 1977 (University of California Press, forthcoming). Collapse ofan Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy. By John L. Campbell. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 231; tables, references, appendix, index. $32.50 (cloth); $11.95 (paper). The Demise ofNuclear Energy? Lessonsfor Democratic Control ofTechnology. By Joseph G. Morone and Edward J. Woodhouse. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. xii+ 172; notes, appendix, index. $22.50 (cloth); $6.95 (paper). The formulation and implementation of energy policy in the United States during the decade of crisis, 1973—83, have been severely criticized in studies published in 1988 and 1989. In addition to the two works reviewed here, two other notable analyses appeared: G. J. Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), and F. Tugwell, The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy (Stanford, Calif., 1988). While differing in subject matter and methodology, the general conclusions offered by John Campbell and Joseph Morone/Edward Woodhouse TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 347 regarding the failure of the nuclear industry in the United States are congruent with the findings of Tugwell, dealing with the whole energy policy scene, and Ikenberry, focusing on oil politics. Each author questions the compatibility of capitalism and democracy. Each author reveals critical intersections at which market forces and democratic politics clashed, yielding policies that, in furthering special interests more often than the public interest, left America’s energy future imperiled. Campbell and Morone/Woodhouse, in complementary analyses, emphasize institutional constraints as the key explanation of what went wrong with the nuclear industry. As Morone/Woodhouse ask early on: Why did America become “fixated on a highly flawed form of nuclear power?” (p. xi). Campbell suggests as an answer: Capital­ ism and democracy “establish contradictory decision-making logics” (p. xii) that prevent the planning that would have made the nuclear industry viable. Of the two nuclear studies, Campbell offers the more comprehen­ sive treatment and is less monocausational in his conclusions. For Campbell, the explanations for nuclear collapse are discoverable within a three-dimensional institutional context: a political economy dominated by the private sector; a regulatory, but ineffectively centralized, state; and the random intersection of state structure with civil society. Within that context, Campbell offers five reasons for the failure of the nuclear industry. The nuclear establishment, including the AEC, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the utilities and reactor manufacturers: (1) failed to adopt a single reactor and plant design (in contrast, Morone/Woodhouse argue that the wrong type of reactor was chosen); (2) undermined planning for reactor safety by speeding up commercialization, thereby precipitating a “massive legitimation crisis” (p. 50) (Morone/Woodhouse agree that...