Collaborative, Sequential, and Isolated Decisions in Design

Abstract

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Commission on Industrial Productivity, in their report Made in America, found that six recurring weaknesses were hampering American manufacturing industries. The two weaknesses most relevant to product development were 1) technological weakness in development and production, and 2) failures in cooperation. The remedies to these weaknesses are considered the essential twin pillars of CE: 1) improved development process, and 2) closer cooperation. In the MIT report, it is recognized that total cooperation among teams in a CE environment is rare in American industry, while the majority of the design research in mathematically modeling CE has assumed total cooperation. In this paper, we present mathematical constructs, based on game theoretic principles, to model degrees of collaboration characterized by full cooperation, approximate cooperation, sequential decision making, and isolated decision making. The design of a pressure vessel is given to illustrate the theory, and the design of a passenger aircraft is given to illustrate the application to a large-scale systems design.