Collaborative governance of haze pollution between local governments

Abstract

Facing the increasingly prominent regional and complex air pollution, the division of labor and cooperation is considered to be a necessary means of haze pollution control. During the collaborative governance of haze pollution, there is a game relationship between local governments in the regional alliance. The governments make choices while playing games and cooperating with each other, based on their own benefits. When the local governments in the regional alliance break the administrative boundaries and cooperate together, what kind of mechanism should be established so that all local governments in the entire regional alliance can actively cooperate is the key to the problem. This paper adopts the differential game method to study the mechanism of collaborative governance of regional haze pollution, according to three situations in the haze control within the regional alliance. The results show that the effort of local governments in the region to control haze is negatively correlated with their governance cost; after the introduction of the supervision, assessment, and punishment (SAP) mechanism, the implementation of legally binding constraints on each subject can make local governments more enthusiastic about haze control, and improve the synergistic benefits of haze control. Multiple co-governance, interactive monitoring, and interest compensation are of great significance to improving the coordinated governance of haze pollution among local governments.