Abstract
In this article we outline a response to Mackay's (2003) critique of constructivism as anti-realist, anti-determinist and anti-scientific. We argue that Mackay and constructivists operate from very different theoretical premises. Whereas Mackay sees his philosophical bases as foundational absolutes, constructivists see theirs (as well as Mackay's) as postulated premises. Thus, Mackay's theoretical assumptions, in combination with his construction of a `straw figure' version of his opponents, lead him to see constructivism as incoherent. However, this tells us more about Mackay's point of view than it does about constructivism's coherence. In our view, constructivism is not hostile to scientific discourse, and, indeed, converges at important points with Mackay's own treatment of `experiential meaning'. Ultimately, however, constructivists attempt to stretch the boundaries of permissible scholarly discourse beyond the realist bases advocated by Mackay, in order to analyze and critique the social epistemology by which both psychotherapeutic and scientific processes are constructed.
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