Abstract

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.

Highlights

  • We shall show that Cohen’s striking claims about value do suggest an interesting new line of argument against enhancement that is in several ways clearer and superior to existing objections

  • As we have suggested in these two sub-sections, the conservative bias cannot ground a sweeping objection to all forms of human enhancement, even if it still serves to highlight the fact that changes to our existing nature, while sometimes justified, should still be a source of some regret, a point that proponents of enhancement often overlook

  • We have argued that Cohen’s views on value suggest a new line of argument against enhancement that is in several ways clearer and superior to existing objections

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Summary

The Conservative Bias and Human Enhancement

On the face of it, Cohen’s views seem to supply powerful ammunition to opponents of enhancement. The intuitive force underlying the conservative objections to enhancement that Cohen suggests is the following: even if the technology to improve certain of our capacities becomes available, and even if proponents of enhancement are correct to claim that the changes that enhancements could bring about would lead to a better outcome, to carry out such enhancements would be to fail to appreciate the fact that human nature as it is bears a certain value, but is valuable (in a particular and personal sense) by virtue of as an anonymous reviewer for The Journal of Ethics pointed out, it might be the case that initial uses of enhancement technologies might be coercive in institutional and political domains (such as the military). The conservative might argue that human enhancements should be avoided, whether they are coerced or freely chosen, in so far as they would serve to replace these special extant values

Critique
Overriding Values
Enhancements that Conserve
Organic Change
Non-Radical Enhancements—Changes that Preserve Essential Features
The Problem of Disloyalty
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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