Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis

Tyler Dalton Mcnabb,Michael Devito

doi:10.3390/rel13010024

Abstract

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.

Highlights

Our focus in this essay is narrow: We develop a model for religious knowledge that shows that classical theism can fit well with cognitive science of religion (CSR)
As for the theologically specific consequences of CSR, Launonen and Mullins note that natural religion lends credence to the claim that humans have been created with a
For Launonen and Mullins, in order for CSR to be considered compatible with theology, Natural Religion must lend credence to the doctrine of general revelation

Summary

Introduction

As for the theologically specific consequences of CSR, Launonen and Mullins note that natural religion lends credence to the claim that humans have been created with a. For Launonen and Mullins, in order for CSR to be considered compatible with (and supportive of) theology, Natural Religion must lend credence to the doctrine of general revelation (again, that God has made himself known to his creation apart from special revelation). Launonen and Mullins utilize the following specific, cognitively natural (god concept) beliefs from the CSR literature (Justin Barrett’s work) to highlight how classical theism is unnatural:. Launonen’s and Mullins claim that the implicit god-concept of Natural Religion is, at its core, fundamentally personal, while, in contrast, the God of classical theism is strikingly impersonal.

Classical Theism and CSR

Romans 1 and the Justice of God

Conclusions