Abstract

We present novel evidence on response times and personality traits in standard questions from the decision-making literature where responses are relatively slow (medians around half a minute or above). To this end, we measured response times in a number of incentivized, framed items (decisions from description) including the Cognitive Reflection Test, two additional questions following the same logic, and a number of classic questions used to study decision biases in probability judgments (base-rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy, and the ratio bias). All questions create a conflict between an intuitive process and more deliberative thinking. For each item, we then created a non-conflict version by either making the intuitive impulse correct (resulting in an alignment question), shutting it down (creating a neutral question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic question). For CRT questions, the differences in response times are as predicted by dual-process theories, with alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses and neutral questions to slower responses than the original, conflict questions. For decision biases (where responses are slower), evidence is mixed. To explore the possible influence of personality factors on both choices and response times, we used standard personality scales including the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the Big Five, and used them as controls in regression analysis.

Highlights

  • Human beings attempt to behave rationally, but they often struggle as intuitive impulses get in the way

  • Concerning the relation between the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) and the Big Five, we found that Faith in Intuition (FI) is positively associated with Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion, while Need for Cognition (NFC) is positively correlated with Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness, and negatively with Neuroticism

  • Our work provides novel evidence on response times and the multiplicity of decision processes for a category of questions which are extensively used in the decision-making literature

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Summary

Introduction

Human beings attempt to behave rationally, but they often struggle as intuitive impulses get in the way. Sometimes the latter are useful, sometimes they invite disaster. Dual-process models from psychology (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Evans, 2008; Alós-Ferrer and Strack, 2014) have received increasing attention in economics. These models postulate decision-process heterogeneity at the intra-individual level, that is, the interaction of more intuitive and more deliberative processes within a decision maker’s mind

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