Abstract
Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that in fact such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct and exhibit semantic coherence. In addition, we distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism.
Highlights
What we think can affect what we see
The interest in that distinction has waned as many studies have shown that attention affects tasks that were once considered pre-attentive, such as contrast discrimination, texture segmentation and acuity. . .. this review focuses on the effect of attention on basic visual dimensions where the best mechanistic understanding of attention to date has been achieved, such as contrast sensitivity and spatial resolution [. . . and . . .] motion processing . . .. due to the existence of models of these visual dimensions, as well as to the confluence of psychophysical, single-unit recording, neuroimaging studies, and computational models, all indicating that attention modulates early vision
There are ways one might attempt to defend Pylyshyn’s claim that attentional effects are external to early vision, either preceding or following it. Their prospects are inessential to our main point: we argue that one can in any event defend on other Pylyshian grounds the claim that cognitively driven attentional effects on early vision do not amount to cognitive penetration
Summary
Zenon Pylyshyn argues that cognitively driven attentional effects do not amount to cognitive penetration of early vision because such effects occur either before or after early vision. Critics object that such effects occur at all levels of perceptual processing. We argue that Pylyshyn’s claim is correct—but not for the reason he emphasizes. Even if his critics are correct that attentional effects are not external to early vision, these effects do not satisfy Pylyshyn’s requirements that the effects be direct and exhibit semantic coherence. We distinguish our defense from those found in recent work by Raftopoulos and by Firestone and Scholl, argue that attention should not be assimilated to expectation, and discuss alternative characterizations of cognitive penetrability, advocating a kind of pluralism.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
