Abstract

The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners’ cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants’ positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect—that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners—depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.

Highlights

  • IntroductionThere is increasing interest in whether (and how) social cooperation is affected by cognitive load

  • There is increasing interest in whether social cooperation is affected by cognitive load

  • Game Investments Game investments were analyzed with a repeated measures MANOVA with facial trustworthiness as independent variable

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Summary

Introduction

There is increasing interest in whether (and how) social cooperation is affected by cognitive load. The present study examines how memory for cheating or cooperation—a necessary prerequisite for reciprocal cooperation (Trivers, 1971)—is affected by cognitive load. We were interested in whether or not social expectations affect the participants’ memory for the cheating or cooperation of interaction partners under cognitive load. Examining the influence of social expectations seems important because social cooperation depends fundamentally on expectations about other people’s behaviors. This can be illustrated with the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Clark and Sefton, 2001), which serves as a model for understanding human cooperation. Given that nobody wants to be suckered, cooperation depends on people’s expectations about whether or not the other player will choose to cooperate

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