Cognitive Liberation

Abstract

Abstract The concept of cognitive liberation was introduced by McAdam (1982) as one of the three central causal factors in his formulation of “political process theory.” The term refers to the process by which members of some aggrieved group fashion the specific combination of shared understandings that are thought to undergird emergent collective action. In particular, McAdam (1982:51) argues that “before collective [action] …can get under way, people must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action ” (emphasis added). Thus it is the combination of perceived injustice and collective efficacy that is held to be the subjective linchpin of movement activity. Indeed, McAdam suggests that, notwithstanding the importance of the two more structural components of the model (e.g., political opportunities and established organizations), it is these shared understandings that are the key to movement emergence. As he writes: “while important, expanding political opportunities and indigenous organizations do not, in any simple sense, produce a social movement …Together they only offer insurgents a certain objective ‘structural potential’ for collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations” (1982: 48). So while the political process model has been roundly criticized for its “structural bias” (see, for example, Goodwin & Jasper 1999), in its original formulation, McAdam assigned central causal importance to processes of social construction and collective attribution. On the other hand, in using the term “ cognitive liberation” to describe these processes, McAdam was clearly ignoring the emotional dimensions of collective action.