Cognitive Dissonance and “The Will to Believe”

Abstract

That we shape our beliefs to align with our actions should be of interest within philosophy of religion and philosophy generally. Cognitive dissonance, a psychological state in which an individual’s beliefs and actions do not conform with each other, presents just such a situation. The idea that cognitive dissonance, by strict evidentialist standards, compromises our epistemic integrity since cognitive dissonance causes us to hold beliefs for which we do not have evidence, recalls the exchange between William Clifford and William James in which they discuss evidentialism, the idea that we should hold no beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In this paper I draw upon extant published research concerning cognitive dissonance theory and religion. I also survey the Clifford–James debate, applying considerations from their exchange to cognitive dissonance and (religious) belief. I conclude by showing how cognitive dissonance can have ambiguous results as concerns the justification of beliefs and that philosophy could benefit from attending to factors impacting empirical aspects of belief formation such as cognitive dissonance.