Abstract
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development retains its importance through showing us how the exercise of agency is necessary to the development of self–world dualism and to the developing ability to frame explicit judgements about the physical and mental world. I begin by describing the Piagetian position in my own terms (Agency: Its role in mental development, 1996, for a fuller account) and then set it in the context of research on the executive functions. I also argue, however, that the theory lacks the resources to explain second‐order mental representation. The theory was insufficiently nativist in general and insufficiently nativist about symbolic capacities in particular. But adopting a nativist view does not preclude one from taking a Piagetian line on the essential contribution of the first‐person experience of agency to cognitive development.
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