Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement.

Lucius Caviola,Nadira Faulmã¼Ller,Julian Savulescu,Adriano Mannino

doi:10.3389/fnsys.2014.00195

Abstract

Research into cognitive biases that impair human judgment has mostly been applied to the area of economic decision-making. Ethical decision-making has been comparatively neglected. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important results. In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive enhancement (CE) and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral intuitions and judgments about CE: status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion, omission bias, scope insensitivity, nature bias, and optimistic bias. We find that there are more well-documented biases that are likely to cause irrational aversion to CE than biases in the opposite direction. This suggests that common attitudes about CE are predominantly negatively biased. Within this new perspective, we hope that subsequent research will be able to elaborate this hypothesis and develop effective de-biasing techniques that can help increase the rationality of the public CE debate and thus improve our ethical decision-making.

Highlights

COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND BIASED REASONING The enhancement of cognitive brain functions by means of technology has become a reality
The aim of this paper is to offer a new perspective on the debate about cognitive enhancement (CE) by identifying cognitive biases that affect our common intuitions and moral reactions
We argue that a number of cognitive biases well-documented in psychology and behavioral economics partly explain prevalent negative attitudes towards CE

Summary

Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement

Lucius Caviola 1*, Adriano Mannino 2, Julian Savulescu 3,4 and Nadira Faulmüller * 1,4,5. Since ethical decisions often involve very high individual as well as collective stakes, analyzing how cognitive biases affect them can be expected to yield important results In this theoretical article, we consider the ethical debate about cognitive enhancement (CE) and suggest a number of cognitive biases that are likely to affect moral intuitions and judgments about CE: status quo bias, loss aversion, risk aversion, omission bias, scope insensitivity, nature bias, and optimistic bias. While the involved biases do not necessarily undermine any specific argument for or against CE—these would need to be evaluated on their philosophical and scientific merits—they might partially explain the general opposition to CE as well as the selective focus on certain arguments and exaggeration of their relative weight It is not unusual for human cognition to selectively search for certain classes of arguments and systematically neglect or undervalue certain others Since ethical questions often involve high stakes, this endeavor can be expected to yield important results for public ethical debate

POTENTIAL COGNITIVE BIASES

Findings

CONCLUSION