Cognitive Attraction Theory and Moral Judgment

Zohair Chentouf

doi:10.4236/psych.2013.41005

Abstract

The present article deals with the processes that underpin moral judgment. In the specialized literature, some concepts are proven to be important mechanisms that build up the moral judgment. For instance, intuition, emotion, reasoning, moral rules, deontology and consequentialism. However, there is a lack of a comprehensive framework, which puts together those key concepts in a clear picture. The present article argues for a more comprehensive view under the light of the Cognitive Attraction Theory (CAT). The derived framework considers emotion as the main facilitator of moral judgment as it acts as the means of conceptual attraction between the different cognitive entities, including moral beliefs and rules. Based on this principle, we show how the moral judgment “evolves” from a moral intuition, sometimes endorsed by a reasoning fallacy, to an elaborated judgment that is a result of a conscious reasoning. With the help of a computer simulation performed with an artificial moral agent that incarnates a computational model of CAT, we show that moral judgment can be deontological or consequentialistic.

Highlights

Understanding moral judgment mechanisms is an active research endeavor (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Blair, 1995; Cushman et al, 2006; Greene et al, 2008; Gross, 1998; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983)
This article presented the Cognitive Attraction Theory (CAT) and explained how its formulation of cognitive processes explains the processes of moral judgment and accurately define the role of intuition, emotions, reasoning, moral rules, and consequentialism
According to Sherer, emotions at this level are more elaborated than at the schematic level. This is exactly what CAT postulates: emotion that is first assigned to a newly created belief may be updated at the end of the attracttion sub-process

Summary

Introduction

Understanding moral judgment mechanisms is an active research endeavor (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Blair, 1995; Cushman et al, 2006; Greene et al, 2008; Gross, 1998; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). According to Bartels (2008), most proposed frameworks cross-pollinate between two concepts: deontology and conesquentialism. The former states that moral judgment obeys moral rules (Darwall, 2003b; Davis, 1993). The proposed framework involves three processes: cost-benefit analysis, checking actions against moral rules, and emotional reactions. According to this account, moral cognition depends on an affect-backed normative theory. If rules that are backed by affect are used, the moral judgment is deontological; if the rules are not backed by affect, the judgment is consequentialistic This account does not explain the moral judgment processes.

Methods

Results

Discussion

Conclusion