Cognition and affect in moral development: A critique of Lawrence Kohlberg

Abstract

Although a theory of moral development is not itself a theory of moral education, it can have important implications for moral education. A case in point is the cognitive-developmental theory of Lawrence Kohlberg) Kohlberg and his followers have for several years been attempting to put into practice in classrooms and prisons the implications of this theory for moral education. His theory is being widely discussed by those interested in moral education, and it seems to be attracting an ever larger number of adherents. So, given the likelihood of its having significant impact on the moral education of children, it is important that attempts be made to see to what extent it can withstand critical scrutiny. A comprehensive critical examination would be a large undertaking. This paper has a more modest aim. It will consider Kohlberg's views on the relationship between cognition and affect in moral development. Kohlberg's theory is distinguished by its insistence that there is an invariant, and irreversible, order of stages of moral development. It is called a cognitivedevelopmental theory because, following Piaget, it maintains that each stage of moral development parallels a stage of cognitive development. For Kohlberg, there are 6 stages of moral development, and one cannot advance to a higher stage until one has gone through each of the preceding stages. The six stages can be divided into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (or autonomous). One of the most persistent criticisms of Kohlberg's theory is that it does not do justice to the affective aspects of moral development) Although he is aware of this criticism, Kohlberg remains steadfast in focusing primary attention on the cognitive aspects of moral development, with the affective aspects receiving secondary treatment. The aim of this paper is to show that, despite Kohlberg's numerous attempts to respond to this criticism, his critics are essentially right. The upshot will be, not only that he should attend more fully and carefully to the affective aspects of moral development, but also that his particular conception of moral stages is in need of serious reconsideration.