Abstract
Abstract This chapter addresses theoretical and experimental approaches to the cognitive underpinnings of action. It begins with a brief discussion of what the study of cognitive mechanisms can contribute to the study of action. It then focuses on the two levels by which cognitive mechanics of action can be studied: within and between task sets. The first kind of study addresses issues of action control. The representational resources and functional mechanisms involved in the cognitive mechanics of goal-directed action are considered. The second kind of study addresses issues of task control. The task-switching methodology is introduced to lay the ground for describing the currently pertinent theoretical frameworks of task-set control. Relevant empirical findings are presented to illustrate how action is modulated by task set.
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