Cogency, Seriousness, Cohesion, and Importance: Assessing the Strasbourg Case-Law on Religion or Belief

Abstract

Abstract In Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom (1982), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined that a view must ‘attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ to be considered a religion or belief under Article 9 of the Convention. The Court has seemed hesitant to provide much guidance beyond the words quoted. This article’s first aim is to attempt a comprehensive interpretation of these requirements by examining clues as to their meaning and scope in the case law of the last 40 years. This includes well-known cases like Pretty and Gough, as well as recent cases like Vavřička and De Wilde. The second aim is to evaluate these standards in light of liberal egalitarian principles, specifically, the principle of ‘integrity’ developed by Cécile Laborde. Integrity refers to the value of living in accordance with one’s profound beliefs, which are distinguished from mere preferences and inclinations. The argument presented is that the objective versions of cogency, cohesion, and importance endorsed by the ECtHR are incompatible with the subjectivist value of integrity. Conversely, depending on which of three possible interpretations of seriousness one finds most plausible, the ECtHR’s version of seriousness may align with the integrity view.