Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest.

Guangming Ren,Yingji He,Lan Liu,Mingku Feng,Floriana Gargiulo

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0204616

Guangming Ren, Yingji He + Show 3 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204616

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Journal: PloS one	Publication Date: Sep 25, 2018
Citations: 3	License type: CC BY 4.0

Affiliation: Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University

Abstract

We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest. A survival cost parameter is introduced to public goods game. Players whose payoffs are below the survival cost will be deleted from the network. The same number of new nodes are randomly connected to the network and randomly designated cooperation or defection. Numerical results show that cooperation can flourish if the multiplication factor of the public goods game is greater than the network degree. We present a simple analytical method to explain this result. The fraction of cooperators reaches the maximum for a suitable survival cost. Furthermore, the initial random network has evolved into a heterogeneous network which facilitates the emergence of the cooperation. Our work could be helpful to understand how natural selection favors cooperation. It suggests a new method to investigate the impact of the survival cost on the evolution of cooperation.

Highlights

The cooperative phenomena exist universally in nature and human society
In literature [20], authors introduced a survival cost parameter, Individuals whose payoffs are below the survival cost will die. In their model, new individuals connected to the network according to the preferred rules and learned the strategies of their neighbors, which still is the framework of imitation dynamics
We analyze relation of the fraction of cooperators fc to time step with different multiplication factor r and survival cost parameter m by using a graph of average degree k = 4

Summary

Introduction

The cooperative phenomena exist universally in nature and human society. Over the past half century, scholars from biology, mathematics, physics, information and even social economy have been investigating the mechanism behind the evolution of cooperation. We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest.

Results

Conclusion