Coercive Diplomacy American-Style.

Abstract

Abstract : The current national security strategy of 'Engagement and Enlargement' will require the United States to increasingly rely on coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool. Since the practice of coercive diplomacy is no longer constrained by the rules of the Cold War, its success or failure is now largely dependent on when and how it is used. In order to provide a contemporary theory that may be employed by American national security strategists, coercive diplomacy is first redefined as-efforts to decisively influence the immediate military intentions or actions of an adversary with threatened force. This new definition is incorporated into a seven-step procedural model which determines when and how the United States should use coercive diplomacy. The model applies several of Clausewitz's principles in a numerically based approach which identifies and evaluates important crisis-related factors. The output of intermediate steps is finally referred to a 'Coercive Diplomacy Menu' that delineates strategies according to poker betting options. Since even the most carefully conceived coercive diplomacy strategy may inexplicably fail, factors which affect predictability of outcome are also explored. The seven-step 'Coercive Diplomacy Model' is applied to two case studies-Kuwait: 1990-91, and Taiwan Strait: 1996. After the historical record of events is established, the model is utilized to illustrate the procedural approach and highlight differences in prescribed strategy.