Abstract
This article analyses the Commission's role and influence under the codecision procedure, by focusing upon a case study of the adoption of the novel foods regulation. It argues that the Commission is neglected in the empirical literature on codecision and that its role is misrepresented by theorists who have a tendency to overstate its weakness. The article finds that the Commission exercises both agenda-setting and gate-keeping power under codecision and identifies a number of conditions that may shape the Commission's influence in other cases.
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