Coda

Abstract

AbstractThe brief Coda indicates how scientific testimony relates to (cognitive) diversity and epistemic injustice. After characterizing these notions, the author considers how cognitive diversity bears on intra-scientific testimony. He argues that it has good epistemic consequences in virtue of adding critical perspectives but also bad consequences in virtue of complicating intra-scientific communication. Relatedly, he notes that cognitively diverse minorities’ intra-scientific testimony is particularly liable to be received in epistemically unjust ways. Turning to public scientific testimony’s relationship to cognitive diversity and epistemic injustice, he suggests that a social environment characterized by an appreciative deference to scientific testimony may help minimize some types of epistemic injustice for cognitively diverse or epistemically disadvantaged groups. On this basis, he suggests that social and institutional initiatives combating epistemic injustice for cognitively diverse groups should be central to the pursuit of the broader goal of aligning scientific expertise and democratic values.