Abstract
Scholars of common property resource theory (CPR) have long asserted that certain kinds of institutional arrangements based on collective action result in successful environmental stewardship, but feedback and the direct link between social and ecological systems remains poorly understood. This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (<em>Anadara tuberculosa</em> and <em>A. similis</em>), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it. Specifically, this study examines the emergence of new civil society institutions within the historical context of extensive mangrove deforestation for the expansion of shrimp farming, policy changes in the late 1990s that recognized “ancestral” rights of local communities to mangrove resources, and how <em>custodias, </em>community-managed mangrove concessions, affect the cockle fishery. Findings from interviews with shell collectors and analysis of catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) indicate that mangrove concessions as common property regimes promote community empowerment, local autonomy over resources, mangrove conservation and recovery, higher cockle catch shares, and larger shell sizes, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Associations without <em>custodias </em>and independent cockle collectors feel further marginalized by the loss of gathering grounds, potentially deflecting problems of overexploitation to “open-access” areas, in which mangrove fisheries are weakly managed by the State. Using Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, the explicit link between social and ecological systems is studied at different levels, examining the relationship between collective action and the environment through quantitative approaches at the fishery level and qualitative analysis at the level of the mangrove landscape. Implications for coastal and fishery management are discussed in the conclusions.
Highlights
Recent scholarship in sustainability science draws attention to the role of collective action and common property institutional arrangements in the study of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 1990; Kurien 1995; Berkes et al 1998; Bray et al 2004; Berkes 2005)
This paper investigates how common property institutional arrangements contribute to sustainable mangrove fisheries in coastal Ecuador, focusing on the fishery for the mangrove cockle (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis), a bivalve mollusk harvested from the roots of mangrove trees and of particular social, economic, and cultural importance for the communities that depend on it
The establishment of community-managed mangrove concessions may represent a potential solution to a crisis of overexploitation of mangrove fisheries in Ecuador, but could result in what Martinez-Alier (2001) referred to as a “tragedy of enclosures” ironically in reference to shrimp farming
Summary
Recent scholarship in sustainability science draws attention to the role of collective action and common property institutional arrangements in the study of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 1990; Kurien 1995; Berkes et al 1998; Bray et al 2004; Berkes 2005). Common property scholars have long maintained that collective action and strong local institutions can play an instrumental role in resource conservation, stewardship, or management (McCay and Acheson 1987; Feeny et al 1990; Ostrom 1990; Smith and Berkes 1991; Bromley 1992; Smith and Berkes 1993; Feeny et al 1996; Agrawal 2001; Bray et al 2004; Rebellon 2004). Questions still remain about the inherent assumptions of environmental stewardship implied by much of the common
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
