Abstract
Concurrent elections are widely used to increase turnout. We theorize and show empirically how concurrency affects electoral outcomes. First, concurrency increases turnout and thereby the participation of peripheral voters. Second, in combined elections, one electoral arena affects the other. In our case of majoritarian executive elections concurrent to proportional representation (PR) legislative elections, the centripetal tendency of majoritarian elections colors off to the concurrent PR race. Third, concurrency also entails spillovers of the incumbency advantage of executive officeholders to the concurrent legislative race. Drawing on quasi-random variation in local election timing in Germany, we show that concurrency increases turnout as well as council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and centrist parties more generally, with slightly more pronounced gains for the political left. As a consequence, concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by leading to less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local governments.
Highlights
Concurrent elections are a widely used tool to make electoral participation more convenient and efficient for citizens
We propose that an effect of concurrent elections on vote shares through higher turnout could stem from three mechanisms
We present our results on how concurrent elections affect aggregate turnout and vote choice
Summary
Concurrent elections are a widely used tool to make electoral participation more convenient and efficient for citizens. It is well established that concurrency brings voters to the polls that otherwise would have abstained Do these additional voters affect electoral outcomes in a systematic way? We study this question in the context of concurrent second-order elections, for which the turnout effect is relevant, and for combina tions of proportional representation (PR) legislative and majoritarian executive elections.. Numerous studies report findings that diverge from this pattern: turnout increases can lead to mildly higher vote shares for minor as opposed to mainstream parties (Ferwerda 2014), more electoral support for the extreme ends of the political spectrum (Finseraas and Vernby 2014), more participation of well-off citizens (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016), or electoral benefits for the left and centrist parties
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