Abstract

This paper addresses one of the major fishery issues arising from the New Law of the Sea, namely the establishment of optimal access arrangements by individual coastal states for distant water fleets operating in coastal state Exclusive Economic Zones. The analysis takes the form of principal-agent analysis in recognition of the coastal state’s inability to exercise full control over the distant-water fleets. Depending upon circumstances, it may be optimal for the coastal state to encourage through time apparent “overexploitation” or “underexploitation” of the fishery resources within the EEZ.KeywordsIncentive SchemeReservation PriceCoastal StateFishing EffortExclusive Economic ZoneThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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