Coalitions as Rivalries: French Socialists and Communists, 1967-1978

Abstract

The game theoretic terms of utility maximization have proven extraordinarily useful in accounting for the formation of governmental coalitions.' In deriving law-like statements from the study of coalition formation, however, the literature has fostered the erroneous impression that political alliances may be explained entirely in terms of each party's interest in the rewards of government participation. In this article we will show that, although policy agreement may be conducive to the formation of a coalition, maintenance of the party's own position plays a prominent role in its behavior once the alliance is established. The current emphasis on ideological proximity in coalition formation must be supplemented with a consideration of other goals equally important to the party. Following a track laid down by Michels, we will show that organizational maintenance may supersede policy goals as a party nears the threshold of power. The case we propose as an example of the importance of organizational selfmaintenance is the old but often strained alliance between the French Socialist and Communist parties.2 Coalition theory can account for the establishment of the electoral alliance between the Socialists and the Communists but does not account for its evolution during the course of the Fifth Republic. The run-off system used for legislative elections during the Fifth Republic generally places a premium on second-ballot alliances between parties if they are to gain seats in the National Assembly. Two consequences of this format have been the compression of the French parties into a few relatively large groupings and the almost total disappearance of the center from the party system. For a rational leader of the French Socialist or Communist parties, the electoral system virtually requires that the two parties agree mutually to withdraw candidates in the second round in order to consolidate the leftist vote and prevent the right from sweeping nearly all the seats. This is exactly what the two parties have done in the last two decades. The model of the rational politician elaborated in coalition theory explains the emergence of the electoral alliance between the Socialist and Communist parties. But it does not explain other aspects of the relationship between the two parties which have been highly variable during the course of the Fifth Republic. The periods of amicable cooperation between the two parties around the 1967 legislative elections, in the drafting of the Common Program in 1972, and in the governance of France after 1981 have been matched by the disarray of the left during the upheaval of 1968, the presidential election of 1969, the demise of the Common Program in 1977, and the failed hopes for victory in the 1978 legislative elections. Why did