Abstract
In Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (“Coalition-Proof Equilibria. I. Concepts,” J. Econ. Theory 42 (1987), 1–12), we proposed the notion of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium and Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. This paper undertakes applications to several economic problems, including the behavior of Cournot oligopolists, oligopolistic entry deterrence, cooperation in finite horizon games, and social choice rule implementation.
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