Abstract
We study the stability of coalitions in multicriteria dynamic games. We use the bargaining construction (Nash product) to obtain a noncooperative equilibrium and the Nash bargaining scheme for the entire duration of the game to find a cooperative solution. Conditions for the internal and external stability are extended to dynamic games with vector payoff functions. The notion of coalitional stability, which takes into account the stimuli for the players to transfer to other coalitions, is introduced. To illustrate the presented approach, we consider a multicriteria dynamic model of bioresource management. Conditions for the internal, external, and coalitional stability are presented.
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