Coalitional Instability and the New Multidimensional Politics of Security:

Abstract

Changing definitions of security and the shift to multipolarity have prompted a move from a one-dimensional to a multidimensional international politics of security. States holding similar positions on traditional security concerns now often hold different positions on `new' security issues, which are themselves more multidimensional than traditional security issues. Our central argument is: the more that the politics of international security are perceived as multidimensional, the less stable will be coalitions. We deploy rational choice theory to argue that a United States-European Union coalition can provide leadership in confronting the instability and gridlock which are fomented by a multidimensional international politics. The alliance is closer than any other to a situation of perfect information and perfect attention and thus is durable in the face of collective action dilemmas. An US-EU alliance could offer both special benefits for its members as well as the political entrepreneurship required to promote multilateral conditional cooperation.