Abstract
Acoalition-proof correlated equilibriumof a game is a pair consisting of a correlation device and a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the device. Adirectcoalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a canonical device such that the obedient strategy is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the canonical extended game. Therevelation principlemay not hold even for two-person games. Direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium may fail to exist for games with more than two-players. For any game, a (pure) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
