Abstract
Experiments on three-person characteristic function aames show that different coa litions are formed with dif f erent f requencies. Typically in asymmetric three person quota games without the grand coalition and with zero payoffs for single players the coalition of the two stronger players is more frequent than the other two-person coalitions [5][6] . Recently Levinsohn and Rapoport have found a very interesting empirical regularity. The relative frequency of the coalition of the two stronger players seems to be linearly related to a structural index which measures the inequality between the quotas [6].
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