Coalition Governance in Belgium and The Netherlands: Rising Government Stability Against All Electoral Odds

Abstract

ElectoralchangeshavelefttheirmarkinthecoalitionpoliticsofBelgiumandthe Netherlands. In the late 1960s, the lines of loyalty between parties andvoters started to unravel, and the tension in government coalitions betweencooperationandconflictbecamemoremanifest(Andeweg,1988;Deschouwer,1994). Electoral competition fed mistrust, and conflicts between coalitionpartiesbecameafrequentcauseofgovernmenttermination(Mu¨llerandStrom,2000,586).Theneedforaworkablemodusvivendiforpartiesinofficetogetherled to a practice of negotiating coalition agreements during governmentformation. These agreements, written by party prominents under a veil ofsecrecy, became comprehensive documents containing substantive andprocedural deals over a broad range of issues, most importantly issues thatwerecontroversial(Mu¨llerandStrom,2000;Timmermans,2003).Asinothercountries with multiparty governments, coalition agreements were meant tohelpcontaincontroversy(Klingemannetal.,1994;Keman,2002;Timmermans,2003).Despiteongoingelectoralchangesandincreasingvolatility,thelongevityofgovernments in Belgium and the Netherlands has increased, particularlyin the last 15 years. In both countries, governments reached the end oftheir legal term in office more often than before.