Abstract
Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size effect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size effect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and players' preferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. Moreover, a core allocation consists of connected coalitions.
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