Abstract
We investigate various theories of legislative coalition formation in a bicameral context. More specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental design to examine the size of coalitions in both the House and Senate across the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This offers us considerable analytical leverage in investigating how changes in key institutional decision rules (the adoption of the Reed’s Rules in the House and the passage of cloture in the Senate) affect the likelihood of passing major policy reform. Our findings indicate that when the size of the majority party is adequately controlled for, changes in institutional structures do not have a significant effect on cross-chamber coalition formation.
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