Abstract
This paper provides information on negotiation patterns in the EU and analyzes the influence of qualified majority voting on the formation of coalitions and the distribution of voting power among the EU states as represented in the Council. Important factors for this analysis are the weighting of votes in the Council, the respective majorities (or “quotas”) required to make decisions and the possibility that some members, because of close policy positions, are more inclined to form coalitions or voting alliances. The paper also provides calculations for the situation in which “connected coalitions” are assumed to form. Tools applied for these analyses are adapted versions of the (normalized) Banzhaf power index and of the Shapley-Shubik index. Results are provided and discussed for the EU’s history and for the present.
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