Côte d’Ivoire

Abstract

Abstract Côte d’Ivoire first experienced a civil war in 2002, but the country’s rapid socio-political disintegration after the demise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 produced several risk factors that would eventually culminate in atrocity crimes between 2010 and 2011. This article identifies a weak state that only exercised jurisdiction over the south of the country, years of instability driven by horizontal inequalities and an identity crisis, past abuses that had gone unpunished, and election disputes that served as triggers for atrocity crimes. The deeply polarized nature of Ivorian society meant that local mechanisms for resolving disputes and building peace were not wholly effective, even though they helped to resolve disputes and prevent violence in some local communities. Findings from the Ivorian case demonstrate the need to pay closer attention to the structural and proximate factors that underpin conflicts. Côte d’Ivoire also presents lessons on the need for decisive action in the face of unfolding atrocity crimes. There was a need for timely and decisive response in accordance with the principles of R2P. Nonetheless military intervention was delayed for months, resulting in avoidable fatalities.