Abstract
In order to increase their stability and neutralize protests, autho ritarian regimes often resort to co-opting opposition, in particular, via offering spoils (important positions) in the legislative bodies to the opposition. In the case of federations, the units of which have their own legislatures, such mechanism can be applied not only at the national, but also at the regional level. Modern Russia is a case in point. The article examines the strategies and practices of co-opting opposition implemented in the Russian regions. The authors document a dynamic growth in the number of regions that practice consensus rule in the legislatures, while maintaining a large regional diversity in the composition of the “ruling coalitions”, which usually do not include all the present parties. The research carried out by the authors demonstrate that, in full accordance with the theory of rational choice, when making a decision to co-opt one or another opposition player, the authorities take into account her strength. The institutional capacity (number of spoils available) of the regional parliaments also affects whether co-optation mechanism will be invoked. At the same time, the analysis of the consequences of co-optation practices reveals their weak effectiveness as an instrument of restraining protest activity of the opposition, especially in the case of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. According to the authors’ conclusion, the limited influence of such practices on political processes in the regions can be explained by both the regional authorities’ actions (a formal and selective approach to co-optation) and the logic of the opposition itself, which tends to see spoils as the recognition of its political weight, rather than a deal with the authorities. Such considerations make the relations between the authorities and the opposition in the regions a positional game, rather than a direct “purchase” of loyalty in exchange for spoils.
Highlights
In order to increase their stability and neutralize protests, authoritarian regimes often resort to co-opting opposition, in particular, via offering spoils in the legislative bodies to the opposition
The article examines the strategies and practices of co-opting opposition implemented in the Russian regions
The authors document a dynamic growth in the number of regions that practice consensus rule in the legislatures, while maintaining a large regional diversity in the composition of the “ruling coalitions”, which usually do not include all the present parties
Summary
Исследования, говорящие о стабилизирующей роли демократических институтов в автократиях, обычно опираются на теорию рационального выбора, согласно которой в своих политических решениях индивиды и группы исходят из соображений личной выгоды. Что если при авторитарных порядках оппозиция может рассчитывать на бонус в виде кооптации в органы власти, то вероятность ее протеста против режима должна снижаться. Дженнифер Ганди и Адам Пшеворский отмечают, что для удержания своих позиций автократ прибегает к самым разным стратегиям, включающим в том числе политические уступки и допуск оппозиции к распределению ренты. Различные партии системной оппозиции могут как соглашаться, так и не соглашаться с «партией власти» по конкретным вопросам политической повестки. Для решения поставленной нами задачи достаточно констатации того, что при любых обстоятельствах существует водораздел между системной оппозицией и доминирующим актором в лице исполнительной власти и что потребность в привлечении на свою сторону противников «Единой России» побуждает все партии этого типа в той или иной мере придерживаться протестной повестки. Законодательные собрания утверждают бюджеты регионов и принимают различного рода нормативные акты
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