Abstract
As distributing centres of trade and transportation network, ports play an important role in the development of the national economy. With the changing of the global business environment, the port enterprise operation environment is continuously changing, and growing problems are becoming increasingly complex. Since challenges, uncertainties, risks, and crisis exist side by side, it is indispensable and beneficial to do a systematic analysis of the development of port enterprises from the perspective of biological co-evolution. This paper uses the evolutionary game model to discuss the dynamic change process and evolutionary stable strategy of the collaborative development of the core enterprise and cooperative enterprise in the port business ecosystem. Then, the influencing factors of enterprise decision-making or action selection are analysed, and the numerical model verifies the accuracy of the model. Finally, suggestions on the development of the port business ecosystem are put forward.
Highlights
Ports are critical nodes of international trade
Assumptions and parameter setting of evolutionary game model Based on evolutionary game theory and the previous analysis, the following assumptions are made: 1) the players in the game follow bounded rationality and need to play multiple times; and 2) information asymmetry exists in the core enterprise and the cooperative enterprise, and they aim to maximise their interests
Construction of evolutionary game model According to the game matrix of the port enterprise and cooperative enterprise, when the core enterprise adopts the strategy of collaboration, its expected revenue is: ux 1⁄4 y∙ðπ[1] þ αΔπ − θ1 Þ þ ð1 − yÞ∙ðπ[1] þ αΔE1 − θ1 þ PÞ
Summary
Ports are critical nodes of international trade. More than 90% of world trade is realised through ports. In a port cluster, enterprises mainly play parallel roles horizontally, while in a port business ecosystem, enterprises play a part in the system horizontally with enterprises in similar industries and play a link in the value chain vertically Both the PBE and port cluster are economic communities, and both induce competition and cooperation (Kocsis 2011). Assumptions and parameter setting of evolutionary game model Based on evolutionary game theory and the previous analysis, the following assumptions are made: 1) the players in the game follow bounded rationality and need to play multiple times; and 2) information asymmetry exists in the core enterprise and the cooperative enterprise, and they aim to maximise their interests.
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