Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game under the Edges Rules.

Xingping Sun,Qingyi Chen,Yibing Li,Hongwei Kang,Yong Shen,Jian Peng,Haoyu Wang

doi:10.3390/e22020199

Abstract

The reconnection of broken edges is an effective way to avoid drawback for the commons in past studies. Inspired by this, we proposed a public goods game model under the edges rules, where we evaluate the weight of edges by their nodes’ payoff. The results proved that the game obtains a larger range of cooperation with a small gain factor by this proposed model by consulting Monte Carlo simulations (MCS) and real experiments. Furthermore, as the following the course of game and discussing the reason of cooperation, in the research, we found that the distribution entropy of the excess average degree is able to embody and predict the presence of cooperation.

Highlights

The emergence of cooperative behavior in rational selfish groups remains an interdisciplinary problem
We introduce the distribution entropy of excess average degree to study the relationship between the degree of nodes and cooperative behavior
When studying the public goods game based on complex networks, we get the following conclusions

Summary

Introduction

The emergence of cooperative behavior in rational selfish groups remains an interdisciplinary problem. Selfish players pursue maximization of personal interests at the expense of cooperator’s, leading to drawbacks for the commons [4] To avoid such harm, many mechanisms have been used to promote cooperation, such as punishment [5,6,7], reputation [8,9,10], reward [11,12,13], voluntary participation [14,15], social diversity [16,17,18], and migration [19,20,21]. Zimmermann [26,27] examined the impact of the “re-edge reconnection” mechanism on cooperative evolution for the first time They assumed that, if the player is not satisfied with the performance of the current opponent, they will cease their connection with a certain probability

Methods

Results

Conclusion