CMAB-Based Reverse Auction for Unknown Worker Recruitment in Mobile Crowdsensing

Abstract

Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS), through which a requester can coordinate a crowd of workers to accomplish some data collection tasks, has been recognized as a promising paradigm for large-scale data acquisition in recent years. Many researches focus on the worker recruitment problem in MCS, but most of them either have the assumption that workers’ qualities are known ahead of time or cannot ensure that workers report costs honestly. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on Combinatorial Multi-Armed Bandit and reverse Auction, called CMABA, to solve the multiple unknown workers recruitment problem in MCS. Our objective is to determine a recruiting strategy to maximize the total sensing quality under a limited budget, while ensuring truthfulness and individual rationality of sensing workers. We theoretically prove that our CMABA mechanism achieves truthfulness and individual rationality, and then analyze the regret of the mechanism. Based on CMABA, we ulteriorly propose an adaptive incentive mechanism, called ACMABA, to recruit workers via the alternative worker recruitment and quality update, which can achieve a higher total sensing quality and lower regret. Additionally, we also demonstrate significant performances of the CMABA and ACMABA mechanisms through extensive simulations on real-world data traces.