Abstract

This article argues in favor of a significant continuity, i.e., a homology, in underlying cognition between prelinguistic tool use in nonhuman primates and linguistic behavior in humans. In terms of theory, the evidence for such a cognitive homology is based on the distinct criteria for intentional behavior and cross-group cultural variation. I argue that these criteria are equally valid in primatological and human linguistic research. In past decades, tool use and natural language use have indeed been considered analogous with one another. However, this analogy has never been applied outside of the human domain. In fact, the discussion of intelligent behavior in animals has grown so controversial that even where the issue of concern is not language, much opposition emerges against the idea that the human capacity for culture is based on inherited cognitive capacities that we share with our closest living relatives. My argument challenges such extreme skepticism and supports the continuity hypothesis. The empirical evidence is based on data from ethnographic fieldwork on ape tool practices and natural languages.

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