Cloning: The Work Not Done

Abstract

The present debate on cloning should by now have made perfectly clear an enormous shortcoming in bioethics. a field--in its available methods--it simply has few helpful tactics, insights, or even good provisional strategies, to respond to novel biological developments. They are treated as if the usual ways of dealing with moral problems were adequate, as readily adaptable to something new as to something old. Cloning was first debated in the early to mid-1970s, and the latest Dolly-inspired round has added little new to what was said at that time. (1) Whether this is because of a lack of good theory, or the long quiescent time that passed before Dolly arrived, or an inability to transcend ideological or other constraints is not clear; probably all of them together. I thought about all this, in a dispirited way, as I read the findings of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings. I was further nudged to think about it when I heard the report, in mid-July, that a Japanese researcher believes he has now perfected the prototype of an artificial womb. When and if that device actually arrives, will we once again be treated to the by-now familiar ritual: the forming of a national commission, the hearing of witnesses and the commissioning of papers, the issuing of a report--and the taking of a moderate middle-of-the-road regulatory stance? Probably so. No better approach is on the horizon. But we might begin working toward one by looking carefully at the commission's report as an example of the problems the field faces. The report's shortcomings reflect more those of bioethics than the work of the commission. A word first about the report. It is serious and conscientious, balanced in its judgments, and fair in its deference to competing viewpoints. Working under conditions of unusual haste, it did about as good a job in sorting through the issues as one could hope for from such a commission. Would more time have led to a better report? Not necessarily. Like bioethics itself, the report is stronger procedurally than substantively. The commission effectively melded into a set of coherent (though eminently challengeable) conclusions the full range of conventional perspectives on novel biological developments. It caught well both the sharpest extremes heard in testimony--from apocalypse now if human cloning is accepted to a what's-the-big-deal-anyway shrug--and the range of possibilities in between. Its conclusions were hardly radical, but that is not to be expected of a commission. Given the state of public opinion, highly antagonistic toward human cloning, and--far more important--the lack of strong support at present within the scientific community for research in that direction, the commission's call for a legal ban on research was hardly a surprise. Nor was it surprising that it wanted a sunset clause of five years on such a ban. That two-part move caught the spirit of the moment--against human cloning--without doing that which is taboo--permanently prohibiting scientific research. The idea of a sunset clause was the perfect via media, of a kind that commissions traditionally seek when opinion is radically divided. In that respect, it was a good political solution, attempting to balance a variety of values and interests. But its political strengths betray its ethical weaknesses. There are three in particular worth noting: (1) the thin moral reasons given for recommending a sunset clause; (2) the dearth of any serious discussion about what the children of the future need for a good life; and (3) the absence of a public interest or common good perspective on the appropriate limits of scientific research. The Rationale for a Sunset Provision The rationale for a sunset provision is this: As scientific information accumulates and public discussion continues, a new judgment may develop and we, as a society, need to retain the flexibility to adjust our course in this manner. …