Abstract
This article analyzes two cryptography discourses dealing with the question of whether governments should be able to monitor secure and encrypted communication, for example via security vulnerabilities in cryptographic systems. The Clipper chip debate of 1993 and the FBI vs. Apple case of 2016 are analyzed to infer whether these discourses show similarities in their arguments and to draw lessons from them. The study is based on the securitization framework and analyzes the social construction of security threats in political discourses. The findings are that the arguments made by the proponents of exceptional access show major continuities between the two cases. In contrast, the arguments of the critics are more diverse. The critical arguments for stronger encryption remain highly relevant, especially in the context of the Snowden revelations. The article concludes that we need to adopt a more general cyber security perspective, considering the threat of cyber crime and state hacking, when debating whether the government should be able to weaken encryption.
Highlights
One effect of the leaks by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 was that both Apple and Google introduced encryption to their smartphones
The cryptowars between national security actors, technology firms and Internet users emerged during the early days of the World Wide Web in late 1992 with the debate about the Clipper chip (Kehl et al, 2015)
In fall 2015, the Washington Post published internal communication from within the intelligence community complaining about a hostile legislative environment on the encryption matter “that could turn in the event of a terrorist attack or criminal event where strong encryption can be shown to have hindered law enforcement” (Nakashima & Peterson, 2015)
Summary
One effect of the leaks by former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 was that both Apple and Google introduced encryption to their smartphones. The cryptowars between national security actors, technology firms and Internet users emerged during the early days of the World Wide Web in late 1992 with the debate about the Clipper chip (Kehl et al, 2015) The aim of this contribution is to analyze whether these two crypto-war discourses are similar. Threat constructions are used for the legitimization of extraordinary security measures that would not be approved by a democratic audience in the absence of a threat These measures include electronic surveillance, Internet censorship (Deibert, 2015), offensive computernetwork-attack capabilities (Lawson, 2012) and exceptional access or state-regulation of encrypted communication, called crypto-politics (Moore & Rid, 2016). The final section offers a critical discussion of the arguments
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