Abstract
AbstractThere is a broad spectrum of positions regarding the question of whether future beings, be they human or non-human, have a moral claim over us contemporaries. Some would deny this; some would concede but only in a discounted form; and some acknowledge the same claims as towards contemporaries. Likewise, there are various approaches to the question of whether non-human animals have inherent value. Anthropocentrists reject this; pathocentrists affirm it for sentient beings; and ecocentrists propose that it applies to ecosystems or even the earth as a whole. In this paper, I discuss the challenge of this kind of moral pluralism when considering the claims of future beings (human and non-human), arising from climate justice. I will introduce a variant of Kantian consent theory as a framework for dealing with pluralism and argue for a democratic consent approach.KeywordsClimate JusticeMoral PluralismKantian ContractualismKantian Consent TheoryDeliberative Democracy
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