Abstract
Auditors sometimes collect evidence from clients that have relatively higher status. While prior research considers the effect of this dynamic on auditor behavior, the effect on client behavior is not well understood. I investigate (1) whether high-status clients are more cooperative towards auditors, and (2) whether this effect dissipates when auditors make more costly requests. I conduct an abstract experiment in which auditors choose how much costly assistance they request from clients and clients choose how much to cooperate. Results indicate that high-status clients are more cooperative, but only for requests that are relatively less costly to comply with. Further analysis indicates that high-status clients are more sensitive to changes in the costliness of requests. Overall, my findings demonstrate that collecting evidence from high-status client personnel could benefit auditors, but only if they manage the costliness of their requests. This conclusion carries implications for practitioners that value client cooperation.
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