Abstract
AbstractThis book is out of step with some well-established verities in the interpretation of David Hume's philosophy. The preference is misguided in at least two respects. In the first place, it reflects certain convictions about the nature of Hume's philosophy — convictions derived from selected passages in A Treatise of Human Nature — that necessarily subordinate the first Enquiry concerning Human Understanding to the earlier work; and so, where they differ, rules it out of serious consideration. These convictions are not addressed directly, but will be counted by the book as a whole, as the aim is to show that the Enquiry is a unified work with a coherent argument, and that the very coherence, and significance, of the argument shows it to be the best short guide to Hume's philosophy.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
