Abstract

The quality of pharmaceuticals has always been a hot issue in the world, and it involves public health, economic development of countries, social stability, and national security. Cleaner production is a prerequisite for ensuring the quality of medicines. However, the various types of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and fake vaccines exposed in the recent years have revealed many problems, such as lacking government regulation, loose quality management of companies, illegal profit of medical service agencies, and failure of patient complaints. This paper’s two innovations are as follows: first, it not only considers the collusion between pharmaceutical companies and medical service agencies, but also introduces patient feedback to study drug quality regulation strategies from a microperspective; second, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving cleaner production pharmaceutical companies, medical service agencies, and the governments to analyze the evolutionary stability using the Lyapunov first rule. The results of the research show that, first, improvement of patient complaint rates can effectively curb collusive behavior and promote the stable improvement of cleaner production drug quality; second, the governments must impose sufficient fines on pharmaceutical companies to avoid a stable strategic combination of collusion; third, enhancing patient feedback can speed up the evolution of the stable choice of legitimate strategies by pharmaceutical companies and the medical service agencies; finally, the government reducing the strict regulation costs can increase the strict regulation rate employed in the evolution process and slow down the pace of evolution to loose regulation. In addition, the simulation analysis was carried out using Matlab 2017b, which verified the validity of the model and proved the practical meaning of countermeasures and suggestions for improving government quality regulation.

Highlights

  • Model Hypothesis and ConstructionIf the patients are treated under a collusion, the patients’ recovery is slow, the medical cost increases, and even an adverse reaction occurs

  • Academic Editor: Dimitri Volchenkov e quality of pharmaceuticals has always been a hot issue in the world, and it involves public health, economic development of countries, social stability, and national security

  • To avoid the conspiracy between medical service agencies and pharmaceutical companies to produce low-quality drugs, we constructed a tripartite evolution game model and analyzed the conditions needed for cleaner production pharmaceutical companies to stably provide high-quality drugs

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Summary

Model Hypothesis and Construction

If the patients are treated under a collusion, the patients’ recovery is slow, the medical cost increases, and even an adverse reaction occurs In this situation, the patients will provide negative feedback to the medical service agencies (distributing negative speech and medical trouble), which is not conducive to social stability and economic development. E government regulatory authorities adopt strict regulation after receiving complaints from patients, and the cost of strict regulation is Cg. If pharmaceutical companies provide low-quality drugs that are strictly regulated, they will be fined Fp. If medical service agencies are found involved in the collusion, they will be fined Fs. 3.2. Based on the above assumptions, the hybrid strategy game matrix among the government regulatory authorities, the cleaner production pharmaceutical companies, and the medical service agencies is shown in Table 1 that considers collusive behavior and patient feedback

Model Analysis
Analysis of Stability Equilibrium Points of Replicator
Simulation Analysis
Findings
Conclusions
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