Abstract
AbstractMany of the events that trigger clawback provisions are associated with risky corporate policies and variable performance outcomes. We propose and test the hypothesis that clawback provisions motivate managers to reduce firm risk. Panel ordinary least squares, general method of moments with instrumental variables, and propensity square matching models all indicate that clawback provisions decrease the volatility of stock returns. The channels that connect clawback presence to firm risk include more conservative investment and financial policies. The clawback-induced reduction in risk-taking appears to benefit shareholders on average. The gains from reduced risk-taking are larger for firms with fewer growth options, lower R&D, and prior wrongdoing. (JEL G32, G34, J33, M41, M52, M55)
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