Classical utilitarianism and the concept of freedom: a response to the republican critique

Abstract

Drawing on Quentin Skinner's recent defence of a 'third' republican concept of freedom, this essay challenges the simplistic claims that utilitarianism has a single approach to the concept of freedom and that utilitarians such as Bentham were universally hostile to the concerns of earlier republican political discourses. The article has two key arguments. The first is addressed to scholars of nineteenth-century political ideologies and shows that utilitarianism and early British liberalism has a more nuanced account of the nature and value of freedom than is traditionally supposed. The second argument is addressed at those, like Skinner, who reject political liberalism for its narrow 'negative' view of freedom in favour of a 'republican' variant. Against such critics I suggest that much of what contemporary republicans wish to defend is already part of certain nineteenth-century utilitarian theories and consequently already part of the rich texture of liberal political ideology.